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This paper estimates the eﬀect of a candidate’s incumbency status
on his or her chances of winning using a large dataset on state legisla-
tive elections in India during 1975-2003. I use an innovative research
design, called Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD), that provides
unbiased estimate of the eﬀect due to incumbency by comparing the
candidates in closely fought elections, and ﬁnd that incumbency has
a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on the fortunes of incumbent candidates
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1in India and the incumbency eﬀect has decreased further in the last
decade. Also, the variation in the incumbency eﬀects across Indian
states depends on the diﬀerences in levels of public good provision
such as the health facilities, rates of employment and poverty, and
state per capita income.
1 Introduction
On average, incumbent candidates in the United States win more votes
and are more likely to win than non-incumbent candidates. (Cover (1977);
Erikson (1971, 1972); Gelman and King (1990); Cox and Katz (1996); An-
solabehere, Snyder and Stewart (2000)).12However, much anecdotal
evidence suggests a disadvantage to incumbency in Indian elections. To
quote the words of a losing Chief Minister (highest ranked executive) of
Karnatka after the state assembly elections in 2004.3
I think it (economic reforms) was ahead of its time, and
therefore, the people did not understand it. But this time, it
was plain anti-incumbency. Lookat what happenedto Digvijay
Singh in MP (Madhya Pradesh), Ashok Gehlot in Rajasthan,
or for that matter, Naidu in AP (Andhra Pradesh). They have
1Jacobson (1985, 1987) contended the ﬁnding by other researchers that incumbency
advantage increased in the United States after the mid-1960s. He agreed that House incum-
bents, on average, won higher vote share in the 1960s as compared to the 1950s. But the
probability of losing for the incumbents had not declined rendering incumbents as likely to
lose in the 1960s as earlier.
2Among various factors given for the incumbency advantage are incumbents’ control
over redistricting plans (Tufte (1973)), increased franking privileges (Mayhew (1974)), in-
creased identiﬁcation with the candidate rather than the party (Erikson (1971, 1972); Cover
(1977); Ferejohn (1977)), increased bureaucratic resources available to incumbents (Fior-
ina (1977)), reputation eﬀects (Bernhardt and Ingberman (1985)) and ability to raise more
campaign money (Baron (1989)).
3Chakravarty, S. (2004). ”This is anti-incumbency, people just want change.” The Eco-
nomic Times, India, May 14.
2all followed diﬀerent growth paths. Naidu has done excellent
work. Gehlot, for one, was very rural-focused. I think people
just want change every ﬁve years.
The view that an anti-incumbency bias is present in Indian elections is also
reﬂected in the following quote.4
The Bharatiya Janata Party had constructed an American-
style presidential campaign around Mr. Vajpayee’s perceived
popularity, adopting a slogan of ”India Shining”. But their
strategyranagroundontherealitiesoftheIndianparliamentary
system, in which voters turned on incumbent legislators who
they felt had done little to deliver. Indian voters are known
for their anti-incumbent attitudes, and the majority of sitting
legislators were rejected in the three-week election.
Using data on state legislative election of 25 states, this paper goes beyond
the casual evidence presented above and provides a systematic investiga-
tion of the incumbency eﬀects in India. More speciﬁcally, I am interestedin
whether the incumbency status of a candidate in Indian state legislatures
raises or decreases his or her chances of winning. The importance of a
study of Indian elections lies in India being the largest democracy in the
world and, hence, in working with a large dataset. As will be discussed
below in detail, the original data collected for this study has over 200,000
observations. Moreover, a ﬁnding that the incumbency eﬀects are negative
there provides a dramatic contrast to what we ﬁnd in many other demo-
cratic countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom, and
thus, may enhance our understandingof the incumbency eﬀects in general.
4Waldman, A. (2004). ”Premier of India is forced to quit after vote upset.” The New York
Times, USA , May 14.
3This paper also improves upon the existing methodologies (discussed
below) that do not address the issues related to a nonrandom assignment
of the incumbency status of a candidate and, hence, provide biased es-
timates of the incumbency eﬀect. The assignment of incumbency status
may be nonrandom due to intrinsic diﬀerences between incumbents and
non-incumbents. For example, only those candidates who are better in
quality than losersmay win, and becomeincumbents. As a result,theeﬀect
that we attribute to incumbency might include the eﬀects due to intrinsic
characteristics of a candidate such as quality.
I use an innovative methodology, called the regression discontinuity
design (RDD), that approximates a natural experiment and gives us an
unbiased estimate of the incumbency eﬀect. The RDD considers closely
foughtcontests,andpremisesthatcandidatesinsuchcontests(barewinners
and bare losers) are ex ante comparable, on average, in all characteristics
which may be candidate speciﬁc such as experience and district-speciﬁc
such as the partisan eﬀects, number of candidates contesting the election
and so on. The only diﬀerence between candidates in such contests is in
their incumbency status. The winning candidates become incumbents and
the losing candidates are non-incumbents. Moreover, the outcome of such
contests is highly unpredictable and may depend on some chance factor,
whichcoupledwiththecomparabilityofcandidates,bringsaboutarandom
assignment of the incumbency status. So, any diﬀerence in their outcome
in the next election will identify what is essentially an unbiased estimate of
the true incumbency eﬀect.
4The RDD has been used in other ﬁelds to isolate the eﬀect of a binary
treatment variable on the response variable from the eﬀect of other con-
temporaneousfactors. Thistlethwaite and Cambell (1960) applied the RDD
to study the eﬀect of student scholarships on career aspirations, given that
students are awarded scholarships only if their test score exceeds a cer-
tain threshold. Hahn, Todd and Van Der Klaauw (2001) and Porter (2002)
provide a more formal treatment of RDD technique. Lee et al (2004) use
RDDonroll-call datafortheUnitedStatesHouseofRepresentativesduring
1946-1995 to investigate whether there is a partial convergence or complete
divergence between the announced policies of candidates.
Lee (forthcoming) uses RDD to estimate partisan incumbency eﬀects in
the United States House of Representatives and ﬁnds that the incumbent
partyis40-45percentagepointsmorelikelythanthenon-incumbentpartyto
winthenextelection. However,Leeestimatestheincumbencyadvantageat
thepartylevel, whereas estimatingtheincumbency eﬀectsat thecandidate
level is more prevalent in the existing literature. Linden (2003) uses RDD
to estimate the incumbency eﬀects in the national elections in India. He
ﬁnds that incumbents in the national elections are at an advantage of about
6.5-9.75 percentage points of probability as compared to non-incumbents
between 1980 and 1989, and starting in 1991, they suﬀer a disadvantage of
14 percentage points.
My results at the state level (Vidhan Sabha) are diﬀerent from Linden’s
results at the national level and are an improvement over his in the fol-
lowing ways. First, the state level elections provide a much larger dataset
consisting of over 200,000 candidate-level observations. The source of the
5data is the Election Commission of India (ECI) which is a constitutional
body overseeing elections in India. The data was not directly readable by
statistical software and was converted in a format suitable for empirical
analysis using an elaborately written software program.
Second, both the pre-1991 and the post-1991 periods have a negative
incumbency eﬀect (incumbency disadvantage). In the pre-1991 period,
incumbent candidates are about 15 percentage points less likely than non-
incumbent candidates to win the next election. The corresponding ﬁgure
for the post-1991 period is about 22 percentage points. As mentioned
above, Linden, however, ﬁnds evidence of a positive incumbency eﬀect in
the pre-1991 period and a negative incumbency eﬀect in the post-1991 at
the national level. He attributes this switch in the incumbency eﬀects in
India to a decline in the dominance of the Indian National Congress (INC).
However, the decline of the INC began much earlier at the state level.
Wallace notes that by 1967, much of the organizational excellence, which
helped her become such a ”catch-all” party in the ﬁrst place, had started
to wane (Wallace (2003, pp 2)). INC lost power in many state legislative
assemblies and, for the ﬁrst time, faced competition from other parties, in
particular regional parties whose popularity was limited to a speciﬁc state.
Third, the magnitude of the incumbency eﬀect at the state level is lower
than that found by Linden at the national level. This implies a greater
incumbency disadvantage in state elections than in national elections. This
ﬁnding is in line with the ﬁndings in US elections where the incumbency
eﬀects are smaller at the state level than at the federal level. Fourth, this
paperprovidesamuchstrongercaseforthevalidity ofRDDwhichrequires
6that characteristics other than the incumbency status of a candidate be a
continuous function of margin of victory. I compare incumbents and non-
incumbents on a greater number of characteristics and employ additional
tests to check for the robustness of my estimates.
Lastly, the comparative analysis across states suggests that the incum-
bency disadvantage is driven by variation in the state governments’ in-
ability to provide public goods such as health facilities, in the rates of
employment and poverty, and the per capita income levels. This conﬁrms
what Mitra and Singh (1999) ﬁnd in a post-election voter survey that voters
care about the provision of public goods by the government. The survey
ﬁnds that four out of ten major problems facing the country are related
to physical and social infrastructure such as drinking water, education,
health, transport,communication and electricity. Chhibber, Shastri and Sis-
son (2004) also ﬁnd survey evidence that voters perceive the government,
especially stategovernments,to be theproviderof goodssuchas education
facilities, electricity, drinking water and so on. I ﬁnd that the incumbency
eﬀect is higher, the higher the per capita number of health facilities, the
rate of employment and per capita income in a state, and higher is the rate
of poverty. The result that poorer states have higher incumbency eﬀects
suggests capture of local democracies by local elites in such states. Crook
and Manor (1998), and Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000, 2005, 2006) argue
that local governments are especially prone to capture by the local interest
group and this tendency increases with poverty and inequality. The ten-
dency is reduced if there are checks and balances in terms of equally strong
opposition parties. But that is precisely what is missing from such poor
7societies captured by the elites, which prevents them from throwing them
out of power.
The outline of the remainder of the paper is as follows. The next section
brieﬂy lays out the empirical methodology. Section 3 discusses various
data issues. Section 4 talks about the empirical results of the paper. Section
5 performs robustness checks on the estimates of the incumbency eﬀects.
Section 6 seeksan explanation for variation in the incumbency eﬀect across
Indian states. The ﬁnal section concludes the paper.
2 Methodology
The sophomore surge and the retirement slump are the two most widely
used measures of the incumbency eﬀect. The sophomore surge is the aver-
age vote gain enjoyed by freshman candidates running as incumbents for
the ﬁrst time and the retirement slump is the average falloﬀ in the party’s
votewhenthe incumbent retires(Cover and Mayhew 1977). However,Gel-
man and King (1990) show that the sophomore surge underestimates and
the retirement slump overestimates the eﬀect due to incumbency. They use
a regression-basedapproach in which they control for the national partisan
swings that were missing from the previous measures. The main limita-
tion of Gelman and King’s approach, acknowledged by them, is that their
measure does not account for candidate quality. Levitt and Wolfram (1997)
argue that a failure to control for candidate quality may bias the incum-
bency eﬀect. They modify the sophomore surge measure by considering
the same pair of candidates overtime to control for candidate quality and
8ﬁnd that the increased incumbency advantage in the US House elections
could be attributable to increasing ability of incumbents to deterhigh qual-
ity challengers.
The RDD, however, disentangles the eﬀect due to incumbency from a
mix of idiosyncratic candidate characteristics and district-speciﬁc charac-
teristics by comparing candidates in closely contested elections. The main
identiﬁcation strategy is that the incumbency status of a candidate changes
discontinuously at the margin of victory of zero. Candidates who have a
positive margin of victory become incumbents and who have a negative
margin ofvictory becomenon-incumbents. TheRDD exploitsthisproperty
of elections and compares incumbents and non-incumbents in elections in
which margin of victory is close to the threshold level of zero margin of
victory. The intuition is that candidates in such elections are, on average,
similar in all other observable or nonobservable characteristics and diﬀer
only in their incumbency status. The assignment of incumbency status is
approximately random because the outcome of such elections is a toss-up
and depends on some chance factors such as the weather conditions that
particular day or traﬃc jams etcetera. As a result, a comparison of the next
period electoral outcome (probability of winning or vote share) of candi-
datesin suchcontestsgivesusanunbiasedestimateof thetrueincumbency
eﬀect.
More formally, consider a simple linear probability model for the ease
of exposition:
wini,t+1 = αi,t+1 + β ∗ Ii,t+1 + εi,t+1 (1)
9where wini,t+1 is an indicator variable which is one if candidate i wins
in election t + 1 and zero otherwise, Ii,t+1 is an indicator variable for the
incumbency statusof a candidate such that Ii,t+1 equals oneif movi,t > 0 and
zero if movi,t < 0, movi,t is the margin of victory of candidate i in election t
and εi,t+1 is the stochastic error term.
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wini,t+1 = 1 | Ii,t+1 = 0

= β (2)
In the ideal case when the assignment of incumbency status is random, β is
the diﬀerence in the probability of winning of the winners and losers or the
true incumbency eﬀect.
However, the assignment of incumbency status is likely to be nonran-
dom because incumbents and non-incumbents have some idiosyncratic
diﬀerences. In this case, the probability diﬀerence includes the eﬀect due to








wini,t+1 = 1 | Ii,t+1 = 0

= β + BIASi,t+1 (3)
BIASi,t+1 = E{εi,t+1 | Ii,t+1 = 1}−E{εi,t+1 | Ii,t+1 = 0} (4)
The equations (3) and (4) can alternatively be written as follows.
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wini,t+1 = 1 | movi,t < 0

= β + BIASi,t+1 (5)
BIASi,t+1 = E{εi,t+1 | movi,t > 0}−E{εi,t+1 | movi,t < 0} (6)
10Inclosely foughtelections,we can expectthecandidatestobe fairly similar.
The RDD exploits this idea by comparing candidates in election t who are
marginally above the threshold where the margin of victory equals zero
(bare winners) and who are marginally below the threshold (bare losers).





i,t+1 = E{εi,t+1|0 < movi,t ≤ ψ}−E{εi,t+1|−ψ ≤ movi,t < 0} (8)
and ψ represents the closeness of the elections. As ψ gets smaller or as
we examine closer elections, BIAS∗
i,t+1 goes to zero and β gives us the true
incumbency eﬀect:
lim
ψ→0+ E{wini,t+1 = 1|0 < movi,t ≤ ψ}− lim
ψ→0− E{wini,t+1 = 1|−ψ ≤ movi,t < 0} = β
(9)
ThoughRDDisacleanresearchdesign,itsvaliditydependsontheintuition
that candidates around the threshold are similar. This implies that only
incumbency status changes discontinuously and all other (observable and
unobservable) characteristics change smoothly as a function of margin of
victory. This intuition may or may not be supported by the data and must
be checked. The continuity of observable characteristics can be readily
checkedwiththedata. Theonlyassumptionmadehereisthatunobservable
characteristics are continuous functions of the margin of victory, which is a
11much weaker restriction on the stochastic error term and means g(ε|mov),
the conditional density function of ε, is continuous.
3 Data Description
The source of election data is the Statistical Reports on General Election to
Legislative Assembly of States published by the Election Commission of
India (ECI).5 Due to the huge task of collecting and cleaning up the data, I
only used data on elections held between 1975 and 2003. Another reason
for using this time period is that district boundaries were constitutionally
ﬁxed between 1976 and 2001, and the data prior to 1975 suﬀered from
frequent redistricting. I consider all the states except the state of Jammu
and Kashmir, where elections were disrupted during much of the sample
period. Table1providesinformationonyearsofelectionsandtotalnumber
of seats for each state in my data.6 Uttar Pradesh has the most seats (425)
and Sikkim the lowest (32). There are on average 5 elections per state and
4,230 constituencies for all states taken together.7 In all, I have data on
24,592 elections over the period 1975-2003. This amounted to a datset of
5TheElectionCommissionwasestablishedundertheConstitutionasasemi-autonomous
permanent body with advisory jurisdiction and quasi-judicial powers. The Commission is
responsible for preparation, maintenance and periodic revision of the electoral roll, super-
vising the nomination of candidates, registering political parties, monitoring the election
campaign including candidates’ funding, facilitating coverage of the election process by
the media, organizing the polling booths, and undertaking the counting of votes and the
declaration of results (Source: www.eci.gov.in).
6In 2000, three more states were created out of some existing states. Uttarakhand
was formed out of Uttarpradesh, Jharkhand out of Bihar and Chhattisgarh out of Mad-
hyapradesh. The new states are not included here because they held only one election
at the time of collection of this data. Also, the elections in the original states after this
reorganization are not considered
7There were no elections held in the following seventeen constituency codes in the state




vote shares, gender and party aﬃliation. There is also information on the
rate of voter turnout, and the number of constituencies reserved for the
scheduled casts (SC) and the scheduled tribes (ST) candidates.8 A major
problem with the data is that the ECI does not always record the names
of candidates correctly. First, a candidate might be reported as last name
followed by his or her ﬁrst name or vice versa in one election. The order
of ﬁrst and last names is switched in a subsequent election. Second, the
middle names are omitted in some elections and included in others. Third,
the full names and initialled names are used interchangeably over diﬀerent
elections. Lastly,thespellingsofthenamesare incorrectlyreportedin some
elections. This made it extremely diﬃcult to track candidates over time
given the size of the dataset.
I overcome this problem in two ways. First, I drop the observations
that have a vote share of less than 5% in any election. The Indian elections
feature a large number of candidates, many of whom perform poorly and
are not expected to have any eﬀect on the eventual outcome.9 Moreover, a
largenumberofthesecandidatesdonotbelongtoanyrecognizedpartyand,
thus, it is diﬃcult to track them overtime. Second, I match the remaining
8In India, some seats are reserved for scheduled casts (SC) and scheduled tribes (ST) in
an eﬀort to safeguard the interest of certain disadvantaged minority groups, who might
otherwise ﬁnd themselves unrepresented.
9There is a large number of ”non-serious” candidates standing for elections. In a con-
stituency named Modakurichi in the southern state of Tamilnadu, 1033 candidates stood for
election in 1996. Out of 1033, 1030 candidates won a combined vote share of 5.81.
13candidatesovertimewithina constituencycheckingfordiﬀerentplacement
ofﬁrstandlast names, missingmiddlenames, spellingmistakes,and soon.
Though the data avoids any major redistricting issues, district boundaries
were reset in some small states like Arunachal Pradesh, Delhi, Goa, and
Mizoram in 1983-1984. As a result, I exclude these years from the analysis.
Due to multi-candidate races as found in India, margin of victory of
a candidate is deﬁned as follows. The winner’s margin of victory is the
diﬀerence between his or her vote share and the vote share of the second-
place candidate. Similarly, the margin of victory of a loser is the diﬀerence
between his or her vote share and the vote share of the winner. This
constructallowsthemarginofvictorytobepositiveforwinningcandidates,
and negative for losing candidates. The biasing eﬀects of seats in which
margin of victory is large or so called uncontested seats are well known in
the literature (Gelman and King (1990), Cox and Morgenstern (1993)). As a
result, I consider elections in which margin of victory is with in 70 percent
of the votes.
4 Estimation of the Incumbency Eﬀects
Incumbents in India fare much worse than their counterparts in the United
States as can be seen from the following descriptive statistics. The average
vote share and the average margin of victory of a winner are about 48%
and 15%, respectively, in India. The same for the United States are 60%
to 70% and 20% to 30% (Lee (forthcoming)). The proportion of incumbents
running for reelection is 0.55 in India (0.88 in the United States). Among
14the incumbents who rerun, the proportion winning the next election is 0.5
(0.9 in the United States). The proportion of losers who rerun in the next
election is 0.21 (0.2 in the United States). Among the losers who rerun,
the proportion winning the next election is 0.38 (0.15 in the United States).
Though these casual estimates suggest that incumbents are disadvantaged
in India, I turn now to more formal estimation of the incumbency eﬀects.
Figure 1 plots the probability of winning in election t + 1 against the
margin of victory (mov) in election t. The scatter plot is the plot of raw
probability of winning (proportion of winners over 0.5 percent interval of
margin of victory) against the margin of victory. The solid curve called the
polynomial ﬁt is the predicted probability of winning estimated using a
logistic regression of the indicator variable for victory in election t + 1o na
dummy that takes a value of one if a candidate won in election t and zero
otherwise,afourthorderpolynomialinmarginofvictory,theirinteractions,
and the state-time ﬁxed eﬀects.10 The estimate of the diﬀerence between
theright hand side and left hand side limits of probability of winning at the
threshold (mov = 0) determines the incumbency eﬀect. The top panel plots
theprobability ofwinningduringthepre-1991 periodandthebottompanel
does the same for the post-1991 period. There is a slight disadvantage in
thepre-1991 period. Inthepost-1991 period,theincumbency eﬀectis about
-0.09 implying bare winners are about 9 percentagepoints less likely to win
the next election than bare losers.
As mentioned above, only a fraction of candidates who contested the
electionintrerunforelectionint+1and,hence,arenotobservedinelection
10All the succeeding plots have this speciﬁcation unless noted otherwise
15t+1. Asa result,the incumbency eﬀectsin Figure1 are estimatedassuming
that such candidates lose the election in t+1. This assumption may lead to
biased estimates of the incumbency eﬀects if the probability of rerunning
diﬀers between the winners and losers at the threshold. Figure 2 plots the
probability of rerunning in t + 1 against the margin of victory in t. The
bare winnersare about 14 percentagepointsmorelikely torerun in thenext
election than the bare losers in the pre-1991 period. The diﬀerence is about
10 percentage points in the post-1991 period. This means that the estimates
in Figure 1 are biased upwards providing us with an upper bound on the
magnitude of the incumbency eﬀect.
To overcome this problem, I condition my estimates of the incumbency
eﬀects on candidates who rerun in t + 1. However, this could give rise
to a problem of sample selection bias in the estimated incumbency eﬀects.
This might be the case, for example, if losers who rerun are systematically
diﬀerent from losers who do not reun. More speciﬁcally, we might have
reasons to believe that only those losers, who are stronger than other losers
andhavehigherchancesofwinning,rerun. Ishowbelowthatmyestimates
of incumbency are free from this sample selection bias.
Figure 3 plots the probability of winning in t + 1 against the margin
of victory in t conditional on the pool of candidates who rerun. There
is a big discontinuous fall in the probability of winning at the margin of
victory of zero, as we move from the left of the threshold to the right.
The discontinuity is not evident at any other level of margin of victory.
The incumbency eﬀect in the pre-1991 period is -0.15 implying that bare
winners are about 15 percentage points less likely to win the next election
16than bare losers. After 1991, the incumbency eﬀect is about -0.22 implying
a greaterincumbency disadvantagein thepost-1991 period. Theseﬁndings
diﬀer from those for the national elections by Linden (2003). First, both the
pre-1991 and the post-1991 state elections are characterized by a negative
incumbencyeﬀect. Lindenﬁndsthattheincumbencyeﬀectispositiveinthe
pre-1991 period and negative in the post-1991 period at the national level.
Second,themagnitudeof theincumbency disadvantage in stateelectionsis
greater than that in elections for the national Parliament. The comparison
between the incumbency eﬀects at the national level and the state level in
India is in agreement with the ﬁndings in the United States. In the US also,
the incumbency eﬀects are found to be lower at the state level than at the
federal level (Cox and Morgenstern (1993)). Figure 4 plots the vote share
in t + 1 against the margin of victory in t. The incumbency eﬀect is about
-2.2 percentagepointsof thevotesin thepre-1991 periodimplyingthatbare
winners get about 2.2 percentage points less votes in the next election than
barelosers. Theeﬀectisabout-2.8percentagepointsinthepost-1991period
and conﬁrms an increase in the incumbency disadvantage in this period.
Asemphasizedearlier, animportantrequirementfortheRDDestimates
of the incumbency eﬀects to be valid is that the factors at t other than the
incumbency status of a candidate be a continuous function of the margin
of victory. A convincing test of this assumption on the basis of all possible
characteristics is constrained by lack of comprehensive data. However, I
check for continuity of various candidate characteristics such as the vote
share in t − 1, the probability of winning in t-1, the electoral experience of
a candidate at t (number of times a candidate has contested the election up
17to t), the political experience at t (number of times a candidate has won an
election up to t), the proportion of female candidates and the proportion of
candidatesbelongingtoIndianNationalCongress(INC).Ialsocheckforthe
followingconstituencycharacteristics: therateofvoterturnout,thenumber
of candidates, the proportion of seats reserved for the SC candidates and
the proportion of seats reserved for the ST candidates.
Table 2 provides thecontinuity checksof characteristics for thepre-1991
period. Columns (2)-(5) show the diﬀerences in the probability of winning
in t + 1, the vote share in t + 1 and other characteristics for all winners and
losers (All), when the margin of victory is with in 25%, and when it is with
in 5%. In column (2), winners, on average, have a greater vote share in
the previous election, have more electoral and political experience, greater
proportion of females, feature in constituencies with higher voter turnout,
have fewer candidates contesting election and are less likely to belong
to a constituency reserved for scheduled tribe as compared with losers.
These diﬀerences suggestthat a comparison of all winners (all incumbents)
and all losers (all non-incumbents) would provide biased estimates of the
incumbency eﬀect. However, the diﬀerences become smaller as the margin
of victory gets closer to zero. In column (4), when the margin of victory
is with in 5%, the diﬀerences in candidate and constituency characteristics
become statistically insigniﬁcant implying they are continuous functions of
margin ofvictory, whereasdiﬀerencesin theprobability ofwinning and the
vote shares in t + 1 remain signiﬁcant.
Column (5) estimates the diﬀerences in the predicted values from a
regression of each variable in column (1) on a dummy variable that takes a
18value ofoneforawinnerin t andzerootherwise,a fourthorderpolynomial
in margin of victory, their interactions with the incumbency dummy, and
the state-time ﬁxed eﬀects. The diﬀerences are computed separately for
winners and losers at the margin of victory of zero. Again, the diﬀerences
in the candidate and constituency characteristics are insigniﬁcant which
further conﬁrms the continuity assumption, while the diﬀerences in the
probability of winning and vote share in t+1 are signiﬁcant. Table 3 checks
for the continuity assumption for the post-1991 period. The continuity
assumption is also valid in this period.
5 Robustness Checks
The research design used above allows me to test for robustness of the esti-
matedincumbencyeﬀects. Wecanfurtherchecktheclaimthattheestimated
incumbencyeﬀectsarenotconfoundedbycandidateandconstituencychar-
acteristics by including the latter in the basic polynomial speciﬁcation used
above (for instance, in tables 2 and 3). The resultant estimate of the in-
cumbency eﬀect should be insensitive to inclusion of these characteristics
as covariates because it is not confounded by them. Table 4 performs these
checks for the pre-1991 period. Column (2) reproduces the estimated in-
cumbency eﬀect of -0.15 in Table 2 using the basic polynomial speciﬁcation.
In column (3), I include the candidate characteristics as additional regres-
sors. The estimated incumbency eﬀect remains virtually the same. The
estimate does not change by much in column (4), where I include only the
constituency characteristics and in column (5), where both candidate and
19constituency characteristics are included.
Finally, in column (6), I use an indicator variable for victory in t − 1
as the dependent variable in the basic polynomial speciﬁcation with all
characteristics in t as the additional regressors. The estimated diﬀerence
in probability of winning in t − 1 should be close to zero, as it is already
determined and cannot possibly be aﬀected by the characteristics in t. This
diﬀerence is -0.01 and is statistically insigniﬁcant. Table 5 performs similar
robustness checks for the post-1991 period. These robustness checks rein-
force the claim that the estimated incumbency eﬀect is not confounded by
other characteristics and is an unbiased estimate of the true incumbency
eﬀect.
In the above analysis, I conditioned my estimates on the pool of can-
didates who rerun in the next election. This could give rise to a sample
selection bias in the estimated incumbency eﬀects as mentioned above. In
Table 6, I compare losing rerunners with losing non-rerunners on all char-
acteristics around the threshold of winning. I regress each characteristic
on a dummy variable that is one if a candidate reruns in election t + 1 and
zero otherwise, a fourth-order polynomial of margin of victory, their inter-
actions and the state-time ﬁxed eﬀects for candidates within a margin of
victory of 5%. All diﬀerences between two sets of candidates are insigniﬁ-
cant suggestingthat aroundthethreshold,losingrerunnersare comparable
to losing non-rerunners. So, there is no systematic bias due to conditioning
on the rerunning candidates. This is not to deny what we already know
from Figure 2, namely that bare winners are more likely to rerun in the next
election than bare losers. But the determinant of running decisions of a
20candidate seems tobe exogenous. For example, in India, thetop-level lead-
ershipoftheparty(orthepartyhighcommand)decideswhomtonominate
for elections (Chhibber and Kollman (2004, pp 86)).
6 ExplainingtheIncumbencyEﬀectsacrossIndianStates
Indiaisadevelopingcountry,wherealargeproportionofpopulationdonot
have access to even basic necessities of life. The picture is really grim as far
as the provision of public goodsis concerned. In 1991, only 42.4% of Indian
populationhadaccesstoelectricity,62.3%hadsafedrinkingwater,andonly
30.4% hadboth. About27% villages didnothavea primaryschooland67%
did not have any health infrastructure (Banerjee and Somanathan (2001)).
Since voters care about the provision of public goods as found by surveys
of voters by Mitra and Singh (1999), and Chhibber, Shastri and Sisson
(2004), the states with greater supply of public goods should have higher
incumbency eﬀect or relatively lower incumbency disadvantage. I use the
numberofhealthcentersandthenumberofschoolsperthousandpeopleas
the two measures of public good provision in a state. I also use the data on
percentage of population below poverty line and the rate of employment
as additional factors aﬀecting voters’decisions.11 Therelationship between
11The education data are taken from the Department of Education,
Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government of India (URL:
http://www.education.nic.in/cd50years/home.htm). The health data are taken
from Central Bureau of Health Intelligence, Directorate General of Health Ser-
vices, Ministry of Family Health and Welfare, Government of India (URL:
http://www.cbhidghs.nic.in/hia2005/content.asp). The poverty data is taken from
Planning Commission, Government of India (http://planningcommission.nic.in/). The
data on employment rate, per capita income and government expenditure are taken from
Reserve Bank of India (URL: http://www.rbi.org.in/). These data are not annual data and
21the incumbency eﬀect and poverty is likely to be negative if the poverty-
strickenvotersareinapositiontoorganizeandassertthemselvesasagroup
to get a favorable policy outcome. However, as argued by Bardhan (2005,
ch 5, pp 96), it may be diﬃcult for the poor to get organized at local level.
Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000, 2005, 2006) further argue that the poorer
sections of the society get captured by the local elites who want the policies
disproportionately biased towards their preferences. In such a case, the
relationship between the incumbency eﬀect and poverty will be positive as
poorer states may exhibit greater control of oﬃce by the local elites and,




where elections are more competitive, incumbents might ﬁnd it harder to
holdontotheirseats. Sothelevel of competitionand theincumbency eﬀect
maybenegativelyrelated. However,ChhibberandNooruddin(2004)argue
that the eﬀective number of parties could positively aﬀect the incumbency
eﬀect as with more parties in a plurality electoral system such as in India
incumbents have to get smaller percentage of votes to win. Butler, Lahiri
and Roy (1995, pp 28) also argue that a disunited opposition has beneﬁtted
the incumbent congress party in elections at the national level in India.
So the eﬀect of competition represented by the eﬀective number of parties
available for a few years for the period of study. The available years for each variable are
as follows: health data is available for 1985, 1990, 1997, 2002 and 2004; education data for
1970-71, 1980-81 and 1990-91; poverty data for 1973-74, 1983-84, 1993-94 and 1999-2000; rate
of employment growth for the periods 1980-90, 1990-98 and 1998-2005. The data on income
and expenditure is available annually for the period between 1980-2003.
22is ambiguous. I use the Laasko-Taagepara index (Laasko and Taagepara








where ENOPj,t is the eﬀective number of parties in state j in election t and
vi,j,t is the vote share of party i in state j in election t. I also use the rate of
voter turnout as another political factor representing voter activism.
Table 7 summarizes the main results of the comparative analysis across
Indianstates. Thedependentvariableisthediﬀerencebetweenprobabilities
of winning of bare winners and bare losers for each state from 1975 to
2003. All the right hand side variables are averaged out for the years
they are available. In column (2), probability diﬀerence is regressed on
per capita number of health centers (Health) and per capita number of
schools (Education). The coeﬃcient on health is positive and signiﬁcant
at 1 percent level of signiﬁcance implying that the higher is the per capita
number of health centers in a state, the higher the incumbency eﬀects (or
lower incumbency disadvantage). However, the coeﬃcient on education
variable is not signiﬁcant. In column (3), I include other factors such as
percentageof peopleliving below thepovertyline and rateof employment.
Inthisspeciﬁcationalso, thecoeﬃcientonhealthispositiveandsigniﬁcant.
The coeﬃcients on employment and poverty are positive but insigniﬁcant.
In column (4), political factors such as eﬀective number of parties and the
rateofturnoutareincluded. Theeﬀectofpercapitahealthcentersispositive
andsigniﬁcant in thisspeciﬁcation. Theeﬀectofeﬀectivenumberof parties
23is positive as suggested by Chhibber and Nooruddin (2004). However, the
eﬀect is insigniﬁcant at the conventional levels of signiﬁcance.
In column (5), I control for state per capita income, the per capita gov-
ernment expenditure and the state population. In addition to a signiﬁcant
positiveeﬀectofpercapitahealthfacilities,thecoeﬃcientonstatepercapita
income is positive and signiﬁcant. The stateswith higherper capita income
have higher incumbency eﬀect. The povertyvariable is signiﬁcant and pos-
itively aﬀects the incumbency eﬀect implying Bardhan and Mookherjee’s
capture idea. Some poorer states such as Bihar, Orissa, Assam and Ut-
tarpradesh have relatively less incumbency disadvantage and, in practice
especially Bihar and Uttarpradesh, are frontrunners in caste politics or in
domination by one group or another. The employment variable becomes
signiﬁcantat10%levelofsigniﬁcanceinthisspeciﬁcationandhasapositive
eﬀect on the incumbency eﬀect.
7 Conclusion
In the United States, incumbent candidates have an electoral advantage
overnon-incumbent candidates. This paperﬁndsan oppositeeﬀect in state
legislative elections in India. Incumbents are not only less likely to win
compared with their challengers, but the negative eﬀect of incumbency
has increased in the elections held after 1991. However, in line with the
ﬁndings in the US, the incumbency eﬀect is lower at the state level than
at the national level. This means greater incumbency disadvantage at the
state level than at the national level in Indian elections.
24The research design used in this paper isolates the eﬀect due to the
incumbency status of a candidate from overall advantage which also in-
cludes the eﬀects due to candidate-speciﬁc and district-speciﬁc character-
istics. The comparability of bare winners and bare losers approximates
a random assignment of incumbency status. In such a situation, the size
of the discontinuity in probability of winning at margin of victory of zero
gives us an unbiased estimate of the incumbency eﬀect. The validity of the
RDDestimatesisestablishedbycomparingbareloserswithbarewinnersat
election t. It turns out that all the diﬀerences in candidate and constituency
characteristics between them become insigniﬁcant, as we compare closer
elections, and thus, any diﬀerence in their t+1 election outcome is because
of their incumbency status. I check for the robustness of my estimates by
considering diﬀerent speciﬁcations to measure the incumbency eﬀect. The
estimates pass all the robustness checks.
The variation in the incumbency eﬀects across Indian states depends
in part on the state’s ability to provide the public goods such as health
centers, the rate of employment and per capita income levels. The positive
relationship between the incumbency eﬀects and the poverty rate suggests
that poorerstates may have been aﬀected by capture by the local elites who
hijack thepolicy making processtofulﬁll their vestedinterestsat thecostof
disadvantagedsectionsofthesociety. Bardhan(2005, pp93) notesthateven
in cases where disadvantaged groups are able to form a viable organized
groupand makepolitical gains, theseare justsymbolic victoriesratherthan
as committed attempts at changing the economic structure of deprivation.
Theresultsof thispaperraisetwointerestingquestions. First, howdoes
25lower expected tenure of the elected oﬃcials, which is a direct implica-
tion of the incumbency disadvantage, aﬀect their policy decisions? Some
endogeneity issues notwithstanding, does it discourage policies that are
desirable from a long run perspective? Second, how does local capture
undermine the policy making process at the cost of the disadvantaged sec-
tions of society? How does decentralization help or hinder the policies for
upliftment of the poor? These are interesting questionsstudy of which will
be extensions of the results of present paper.
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34Table 1: Years of Election and Number of Seats
State Years of Election  Number of Seats 
Andhra Pradesh  1978, 1983, 1985, 1989, 1994, 1999  294 
Arunachal Pradesh  1978, 1980, 1984, 1990, 1995, 1999  Before 1984=30 and after 1984=60 
Assam 1978,  1983,  1985, 1991, 1996, 2001  126 
Bihar 1977,  1980,  1985, 1990, 1995, 2000  324 
Delhi 1977,  1983,  1993, 1998  Before1983= 56 and after 1983=70 
Goa  1977, 1980, 1984, 1989, 1994, 1999  Before 1984=30 and after 1984=40 
Gujarat 1975,  1980,  1985,  1990, 1993, 1998, 2002  182 
Haryana 1977,  1982,  1987, 1991, 1996, 2000  90 
Himachal Pradesh  1977, 1982, 1985, 1990, 1993, 1998, 2003  68 
Karnataka 1978,  1983, 1985, 1989, 1994, 1999  224 
Kerala  1977, 1980, 1982, 1987, 1991, 1996, 2001  140 
Madhya Pradesh  1977, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1993, 1998  320 
Maharashtra 1978,  1980,  1985, 1990, 1995, 1999  288 
Manipur 1980,  1984,  1990, 1995, 2000, 2002  60 
Meghalya 1978,  1983,  1988, 1993, 1998, 2003  60 
Mizoram  1978, 1979, 1984, 1987, 1989, 1993, 1998  Before 1984=30 and after 1984=60 
Nagaland 1977,  1982,  1987,  1989, 1993, 1998, 2003  60 
Orissa 1977,  1980,  1985, 1990, 1995, 2000  147 
Punjab 1977,  1980,  1985, 1992, 1997, 2002  117 
Rajasthan 1977,  1980,  1985, 1990, 1993, 1998  200 
Sikkim 1979,  1985,  1989, 1994, 1999  32 
Tamilnadu  1977, 1980, 1984, 1989, 1991, 1996, 2001  234 
Tripura 1977,  1983,  1988, 1993, 1998, 2003  60 
Utter Pradesh  1977, 1980, 1985, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1996  425 
West Bengal  1977, 1982, 1987, 1991, 1996, 2001  294 
35Table 2: Incumbency Eﬀects and Predetermined Characteristics: The Pre-
1991 Period
(1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
Difference between Winners and Losers 
All » margin»d  25%  » margin»d 5%  Polynomial fit 
































































































Observations 16,486  12,654 3,550  16,486 
Notes: The values in the table are the diﬀerences between winners and losers in the variables in column (1).
All comparisons are conditional on rerunning. Standard errorsare in the parenthesis and are clustered at the
state level for the polynomial ﬁt which is a regression of each variable in column (1) on a dummy variable
indicating the incumbency status of the candidate at t+1, a fourth order polynomial of margin of victory,
their interactions with incumbency dummy and the state-year ﬁxed eﬀects. The values with *** and ** are
signiﬁcant at 1% and 5% levels of signiﬁcance respectively.
36Table 3: Incumbency Eﬀects and Predetermined Characteristics: the Post-
1991 period
(1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Difference between Winners and Losers 

























































































































Observations 7,699  6,308  1,951  7,699 
Notes: The values in the table are the diﬀerences between winners and losers in the variables in column (1).
All comparisons are conditional on rerunning. Standard errorsare in the parenthesis and are clustered at the
state level for the polynomial ﬁt which is a regression of each variable in column (1) on a dummy variable
indicating the incumbency status of the candidate at t+1, a fourth order polynomial of margin of victory,
their interactions with incumbency dummy and the state-year ﬁxed eﬀects. The values with *** and ** are
signiﬁcant at 1% and 5% levels of signiﬁcance respectively.
37Table4: IncumbencyEﬀectsBasedonDiﬀerentSpeciﬁcations: ThePre-1991
period
(1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 
Incumbency Effect  Probability 














Experience No Yes No Yes Yes
Political  
Experience No Yes No Yes Yes
Vote Share 
In t-1 No Yes No Yes
Probability of 
Winning in t-1 No Yes No Yes
Proportion of 
Female Candidate   No Yes No Yes Yes
Proportion of INC 
Candidates  No Yes No Yes Yes
Rate of 
Turnout   No No Yes Yes Yes
Number of  
candidates No No Yes Yes Yes
Proportion of 
Scheduled Casts  No No Yes Yes Yes
Proportion of 
Scheduled Tribes  No No Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 16,486  16,486 16,486  16,486 16,486 
Notes: The basic speciﬁcation in column (1) regresses a dummy variable indicating victory in t+1o na
dummy variable indicating the incumbency status of the candidate at t+1, a fourth order polynomial of
margin of victory,their interactions with incumbency dummyand the state-year ﬁxed eﬀects. The remaining
columns add the speciﬁed covariates to the basic speciﬁcation. Standard errors are in the parenthesis and
are clustered at the state level. The values with *** and ** are signiﬁcant at 1% and 5% levels of signiﬁcance
respectively.
38Table 5: Incumbency Eﬀects Based on Diﬀerent Speciﬁcations: The Post-
1991 period
(1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 
Incumbency Effect  Probability 














Experience No Yes No Yes Yes
Political  
Experience No Yes No Yes Yes
Vote Share 
In t-1 No Yes No Yes
Probability of 
Winning in t-1 No Yes No Yes
Proportion of 
Female Candidate   No Yes No Yes Yes
Proportion of INC 
Candidates  No Yes No Yes Yes
Rate of 
Turnout   No No Yes Yes Yes
Number of  
candidates No No Yes Yes Yes
Proportion of 
Scheduled Casts  No No Yes Yes Yes
Proportion of 
Scheduled Tribes  No No Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations  7,699 7,699 7,699  7,699  7,699 
Notes: The basic speciﬁcation in column (1) regresses a dummy variable indicating victory in t+1o na
dummy variable indicating the incumbency status of the candidate at t+1, a fourth order polynomial of
margin of victory,their interactions with incumbency dummyand the state-year ﬁxed eﬀects. The remaining
columns add the speciﬁed covariates to the basic speciﬁcation. Standard errors are in the parenthesis and
are clustered at the state level. The values with *** and ** are signiﬁcant at 1% and 5% levels of signiﬁcance
respectively.
39Table 6: A comparison of losing rerunners and losing non-rerunners
(1) (2)  (3) 
Difference 
The Pre-1991 Period  The Post-1991 Period 








































Observations 3509  1690 
Notes: All characteristics are regressed on a dummy variable indicating if a candidate reruns in the next
election, a fourth order polynomial of margin of victory, their interactions with the rerun dummy and the
state-year ﬁxed eﬀects around the threshold. Standard errors are in the parenthesis and are clustered at the
state level. The values with *** and ** are signiﬁcant at 1% and 5% levels of signiﬁcance respectively.
40Table 7: Explaining the Incumbency Eﬀects Across Indian States
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Incumbency Effect 
Health 2.04***  2.1***  2.21***  2.47*** 
(0.71) (0.69) (0.70) (0.82) 
Education -0.14  -0.22 -0.14 -0.15 
(0.25) (0.26) (0.27) (0.21) 
Poverty Rate  0.006  0.005  0.02*** 
(0.004) (0.004)  (0.00) 












Turnout Rate  -0.007  0.00 
(0.006) (0.01) 






Population  -0.00 
(0.00)
Observations 25 25 25 24
R-squared  0.33 0.43 0.47 0.61 
Notes: Standard errors are in the parenthesis. The values with ***, ** and * are signiﬁcant at 1%, 5% and 10%
levels of signiﬁcance respectively.
41